while it's the same for all presently supported archs, it differs at
least on sparc, and conceptually it's no less arch-specific than the
other O_* macros. O_SEARCH and O_EXEC are still defined in terms of
O_PATH in the main fcntl.h.
the previous values (2k min and 8k default) were too small for some
archs. aarch64 reserves 4k in the signal context for future extensions
and requires about 4.5k total, and powerpc reportedly uses over 2k.
the new minimums are chosen to fit the saved context and also allow a
minimal signal handler to run.
since the default (SIGSTKSZ) has always been 6k larger than the
minimum, it is also increased to maintain the 6k usable by the signal
handler. this happens to be able to store one pathname buffer and
should be sufficient for calling any function in libc that doesn't
involve conversion between floating point and decimal representations.
x86 (both 32-bit and 64-bit variants) may also need a larger minimum
(around 2.5k) in the future to support avx-512, but the values on
these archs are left alone for now pending further analysis.
the value for PTHREAD_STACK_MIN is not increased to match MINSIGSTKSZ
at this time. this is so as not to preclude applications from using
extremely small thread stacks when they know they will not be handling
signals. unfortunately cancellation and multi-threaded set*id() use
signals as an implementation detail and therefore require a stack
large enough for a signal context, so applications which use extremely
small thread stacks may still need to avoid using these features.
these macros have the same distinct definition on blackfin, frv, m68k,
mips, sparc and xtensa kernels. POLLMSG and POLLRDHUP additionally
differ on sparc.
the memory model we use internally for atomics permits plain loads of
values which may be subject to concurrent modification without
requiring that a special load function be used. since a compiler is
free to make transformations that alter the number of loads or the way
in which loads are performed, the compiler is theoretically free to
break this usage. the most obvious concern is with atomic cas
constructs: something of the form tmp=*p;a_cas(p,tmp,f(tmp)); could be
transformed to a_cas(p,*p,f(*p)); where the latter is intended to show
multiple loads of *p whose resulting values might fail to be equal;
this would break the atomicity of the whole operation. but even more
fundamental breakage is possible.
with the changes being made now, objects that may be modified by
atomics are modeled as volatile, and the atomic operations performed
on them by other threads are modeled as asynchronous stores by
hardware which happens to be acting on the request of another thread.
such modeling of course does not itself address memory synchronization
between cores/cpus, but that aspect was already handled. this all
seems less than ideal, but it's the best we can do without mandating a
C11 compiler and using the C11 model for atomics.
in the case of pthread_once_t, the ABI type of the underlying object
is not volatile-qualified. so we are assuming that accessing the
object through a volatile-qualified lvalue via casts yields volatile
access semantics. the language of the C standard is somewhat unclear
on this matter, but this is an assumption the linux kernel also makes,
and seems to be the correct interpretation of the standard.
this syscall allows fexecve to be implemented without /proc, it is new
in linux v3.19, added in commit 51f39a1f0cea1cacf8c787f652f26dfee9611874
(sh and microblaze do not have allocated syscall numbers yet)
added a x32 fix as well: the io_setup and io_submit syscalls are no
longer common with x86_64, so use the x32 specific numbers.
the definitions are generic for all kernel archs. exposure of these
macros now only occurs on the same feature test as for the function
accepting them, which is believed to be more correct.
these syscalls are new in linux v3.18, bpf is present on all
supported archs except sh, kexec_file_load is only allocted for
x86_64 and x32 yet.
bpf was added in linux commit 99c55f7d47c0dc6fc64729f37bf435abf43f4c60
kexec_file_load syscall number was allocated in commit
f0895685c7fd8c938c91a9d8a6f7c11f22df58d2
these syscalls are new in linux v3.17 and present on all supported
archs except sh.
seccomp was added in commit 48dc92b9fc3926844257316e75ba11eb5c742b2c
it has operation, flags and pointer arguments (if flags==0 then it is
the same as prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP,...)), the uapi header for flag
definitions is linux/seccomp.h
getrandom was added in commit c6e9d6f38894798696f23c8084ca7edbf16ee895
it provides an entropy source when open("/dev/urandom",..) would fail,
the uapi header for flags is linux/random.h
memfd_create was added in commit 9183df25fe7b194563db3fec6dc3202a5855839c
it allows anon mmap to have an fd, that can be shared, sealed and needs no
mount point, the uapi header for flags is linux/memfd.h
based on patch by Jens Gustedt.
mtx_t and cnd_t are defined in such a way that they are formally
"compatible types" with pthread_mutex_t and pthread_cond_t,
respectively, when accessed from a different translation unit. this
makes it possible to implement the C11 functions using the pthread
functions (which will dereference them with the pthread types) without
having to use the same types, which would necessitate either namespace
violations (exposing pthread type names in threads.h) or incompatible
changes to the C++ name mangling ABI for the pthread types.
for the rest of the types, things are much simpler; using identical
types is possible without any namespace considerations.
unfortunately this needs to be able to vary by arch, because of a huge
mess GCC made: the GCC definition, which became the ABI, depends on
quirks in GCC's definition of __alignof__, which does not match the
formal alignment of the type.
GCC's __alignof__ unexpectedly exposes the an implementation detail,
its "preferred alignment" for the type, rather than the formal/ABI
alignment of the type, which it only actually uses in structures. on
most archs the two values are the same, but on some (at least i386)
the preferred alignment is greater than the ABI alignment.
I considered using _Alignas(8) unconditionally, but on at least one
arch (or1k), the alignment of max_align_t with GCC's definition is
only 4 (even the "preferred alignment" for these types is only 4).
when manipulating the robust list, the order of stores matters,
because the code may be asynchronously interrupted by a fatal signal
and the kernel will then access the robust list in what is essentially
an async-signal context.
previously, aliasing considerations made it seem unlikely that a
compiler could reorder the stores, but proving that they could not be
reordered incorrectly would have been extremely difficult. instead
I've opted to make all the pointers used as part of the robust list,
including those in the robust list head and in the individual mutexes,
volatile.
in addition, the format of the robust list has been changed to point
back to the head at the end, rather than ending with a null pointer.
this is to match the documented kernel robust list ABI. the null
pointer, which was previously used, only worked because faults during
access terminate the robust list processing.
With the exception of a fenv implementation, the port is fully featured.
The port has been tested in or1ksim, the golden reference functional
simulator for OpenRISC 1000.
It passes all libc-test tests (except the math tests that
requires a fenv implementation).
The port assumes an or1k implementation that has support for
atomic instructions (l.lwa/l.swa).
Although it passes all the libc-test tests, the port is still
in an experimental state, and has yet experienced very little
'real-world' use.
Rich Felker
Szabolcs Nagy
Trutz Behn
Stefan Kristiansson